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De "espite recent attempts to impose disci-
pline on the federal budget-making proc-
ess, federal budget deficits have continued
to escalate over the past several years. The
prospect of still larger deficits over the next
few years has stimulated discussion about
how to bring them under control. Some
have suggested reforms that would enable
the federal government to achieve balanced
budgets, not necessarily in every year in
the future, but at least on average over a
number of years.
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On the face of it. such recommendations
seem to be sensible. On January 30. how-
ever, the government released 1991 pro-
jections for not one. but as many as four
different types of deficits, each based on
a different definition of items included in
the calculation.' The question then
arises: Which of these deficits should be
targeted for elimination? This paradoxical
set of events suggests a need to reexam-
ine the concerns prompted by large
budget shortfalls.
Two components underlie the generally
accepted wisdom about why budget def-
icits are important. First, as a matter of in-
tergenerational equity, it is important to
know how much of the burden of paying
for government expenditure is being
shifted onto future generations. Many
people mistakenly think that the reported
annual budget deficit measures the extent
of such a redistribution resulting from
current policy. Second, a shifting of the
payments burden onto future generations
is likely to adversely affect these genera-
tions' incentives to work, save, and
invest. Thus, large redistributions of
wealth away from future generations
are likely to be detrimental to future
economic growth.
Correct measurement of the intergenera-
tional redistributive impact of any fiscal
policy is, quite obviously, a precondition
for evaluating the policy's implications
for future economic growth. This Eco-
nomic Commentary surveys the reasons
for doubting that deficits, as convention-
ally defined, are adequate measures of
the effect of fiscal policy on intergen-
erational redistribution. It also suggests
that evaluation on this score would be
improved by looking at generational
accounts — a system designed to reflect
consistently the intergenerational redis-
tribution implications of current fiscal
policy and of future policy changes.
• The Deficit — an Inadequate
Measure of Fiscal Policy
Dissatisfaction with reported deficits has
led to suggestions for making various cor-
rections tojhe deficit and to public debt
numbers. These include adjustments for
inflation, for market values of govern-
ment assets, for economic growth, and
for state and local budget surpluses.
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However, the problem with using the
deficit as an indicator of policy runs
deeper than any of these modifications
can fathom. It can be shown that deficit
numbers, no matter how they are meas-
ured, reflect nothing more than the rules
of accounting used in their computation.
The federal government often adopts
fiscal policies whose long-term impli-
cations for intergenerational wealth
redistribution are not correctly re-
flected in published budget-deficit
numbers. Correct measurement of
such policy-induced redistribution is
important in order to gauge the likely
impact of policy changes on future
economic growth. Generational
accounting provides a new method
for investigating this issue. An appli-
cation of this method for the United
States reveals that today's fiscal poli-
cies involve a substantial imbalance
in the treatment of current and future
generations.and that such numbers are devoid of
economic content.
The starkest example of the dependence
of the size of the deficit on accounting
conventions is provided by the Social
Security system. At its inception, the
system was unfunded: The elderly gen-
erations then alive received old-age
benefits that were financed from Social
Security contributions of the then-
working-age generations. Implicit in
this scheme was a promise of future
benefits for the current contributors.
The contributions, however, were
called "taxes." and the old-age benefits
to be paid in the future were labeled
"transfers." If the words describing
these transactions had. instead, been
"borrowing" and "repayment of prin-
cipal and interest." respectively, the
sizes of the recorded government defi-
cits as far back as the 1960s and 1970s
would have been many times larger
than the S200 billion deficits reported
during the late 1980s.
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The installation of an unfunded Social
Security system is just one example of
how the government can engage in redis-
tributive fiscal policies whose long-term
implications are not correctly reflected
in the reported deficit. An equal reve-
nue shift from sales/excise taxation to
income taxation, for example, would
redistribute wealth from younger and
future generations to older generations.
This is because the young pay relative-
ly more through income taxes, while
the old pay relatively more in sales/
excise (consumption) taxes. A revenue-
neutral elimination of investment incen-
tives would also redistribute wealth
from younger and future generations to
older generations."
Hence, by combining policies that are re-
flected in the deficit with others that are
not. by arbitrarily labeling government
receipts and payments, and by changing
accounting conventions and inclusion
rules, the government can essentially re-
port any number as the current deficit
while following the same underlying fis-
cal policy. Deficit numbers can mislead
the public into thinking that government
fiscal policy is profligate when it may
really be prudent, and vice versa Be-
cause conventionally reported deficits
are arbitrary, we need to seek bcttsr
measures of fiscal policy.
• The Need for an Alternative
Measure of Fiscal Policy
The annually reported deficit is a num-
ber reflecting the current net cash flow
of the government. The government,
however, often engages in fiscal poli-
cies that have long-term consequences.
Several of its policies, such as the intro-
duction and modification of an un-
funded Social Security system, changes
in the relative importance of consump-
tion and income taxation, and the intro-
duction and subsequent elimination of
investment incentives, have significant
long-term effects on the resources of
private individuals.
Consider, for example, the 1983 Social
Security Amendment. This amendment
mandated higher payroll taxes now and
lower benefits in the future in order to
reduce the burden on future working
generations of supporting the baby
boomers who will begin to retire early
in the next century. The Social Security
system is currently generating large
surpluses which, when added to the
rest of the government's budget, reduce
the magnitude of the reported federal
budget deficit today. In 1983. however,
when the policy was changed, the
reported deficit was unaffected.
The long-term implications of a given
policy will typically vary for individuals
belonging to different generations. In gen-
eral, fiscal policies redefine how much
each generation will pay for government
spending now and in the future. In short,
these policies are really generational pol-
icies, and they need to be recognized as
such. Thus, in order to evaluate current
fiscal policy, one must examine its gen-
erational stance — how it redistributes
the burden of paying for government
spending among different currently living
and future generations. This, in fact, is
the concern underlying the word deficit.
• What Are Generational Accounts?
risci! policies "r-jl: :r. zr. ~pr?pr:p.!:?-
of resources for the government's oper-
ation. The burden of financing govern-
ment spending will not. in general, fall
given fiscal policy, members of each
generation make payments to and re-
ceive payments from the government at
different points during their lifetimes.
A change in any component of fiscal
policy implies a change in the amounts
and timing of these payments. Genera-
tional accounts (GAs) track the dis-
tribution of the net-payments burden
among different existing and future
generations that is implied by the cur-
rent set of fiscal policies.
The GA for any given generation meas-
ures the present value of the net payments
that each member of that generation is
projected to make, on average, under cur-
rent policy over his or her remaining life-
time. Thus, a policy-induced change in
GAs will indicate which generations lose,
and which gain, as a result of the change
in policy. The changes in the GAs will re-
flect current as well as projected future
losses and gains arising from the policy
change. In evaluations of how any such
modification affects the intergenerational
distribution of paying for government
consumption, it is these policy-induced
changes in the GAs of different current
and future generations, rather than the
reported deficit, that should be the focus
of attention.
• How Are Generational
Accounts Computed?
The entire current and future consumption
spending by the government must be
paid for by at least one of three sources:
1) the government's current net wealth,
2) resources taken from generations cur-
rently alive, and 3) resources taken from
generations as yet unborn. Computing
GAs. then, involves the following steps:
First, obtain the present value of the gov-
ernment's current and future projected
spending levels that are implicit under
current spending policies. Second, esti-
mate the government's current net wealth.
Third, compute the present value of the
projected net payments that each existing
generation is expected to make under cur-
rent policy over its remaining lifetime.TABLE 1 THE COMPOSITION OF MALE AND FEMALE GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTS-








































































































































































































































































































a. Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance.
b. Health Insurance.
c. Aid to Families with Dependent Children.
SOURCE: Alan Auerbach. Jagadeesh Gokhale. and Laurence Kotlikoff. "Generational Accounts: A Meaningful Alternative to Deficit Accounting." in David Bradford,
ed.. TJ.\ Policy and the Economy, National Bureau of Economic Research and MIT Press. No. 5. 1991.
Once the present value of government
spending and the present value of two
of the sources for financing it are
known, the present value of the third
component — the amount that needs to
be taken from future generations—can
be obtained as a residual. We do not
know how this payments burden will
actually be distributed among future
generations. For the purpose of illustra-
tion, however, it can be assumed to be
distributed equally except for an adjust-
ment for economic growth. Future
generation-specific population projec-
tions can then be used to obtain the per
capita net-payment burden on future
generations.
• Generational Accounts as of 1989
A breakdown of the net payments of cur-
rent generations according to types of
receipts and payments is given in table 1.
Several features are notable: First, the
GAs show a significant life-cycle profile
of the distribution of remaining lifetime
net-payment burdens on current genera-
tions. Young and middle-aged genera-
tions make positive net payments to the
government in present value, while older
generations receive, on net, in present
value, mainly because of large Social
Security and Medicare benefits.
Second, middle-aged generations pay
more in present value than do the very
young, because the former are closer to
their high-earning and high-taxpaying
years. Third, older female generations
begin receiving, on net, earlier than
males because of Social Security sur-
vivor benefits and the higher mortality of
their generally older spouses. These
generations also receive, on net. more
than males because of their relatively
lower income and payroll tax liabilities
over their remaining life spans.
Particularly striking is the comparison be-
tween the GA for current (1989) male
newboms (573,700) and that for future
generations ($89,500). The growth-
adjusted differential between these two
numbers is 20.5 percent.
8"
9 In other
words, if the treatment of current genera-
tions is maintained as under current
policy, and if future projected per capita
government spending remains the same,
each member of every fjrjrr jrrTABLE 2 ADDITIONAL PRESENT VA'LUE OF NET PAYMENTS


















































































































SOURCE: Alan Auerbach. Jagadeesh Gokhale. and Laurence Kotlikoff. "Generational Accounts: A New
Approach for Understanding the Effects of Fiscal Policy on Saving." Scandinavian Economic Review,
forthcoming 1992.
will bear a 20.5 percent larger burden
than that imposed on current newborns.
This indicates that current fiscal policy
involves a substantial generational im-
balance.
A generationally balanced fiscal policy, if
kept in place, will result in the balance be-
ing preserved through time. Under such a
policy, every new generation will pay an
amount that leaves the same growth-
adjusted, net-payment burden on subse-
quent generations. On the other hand, a
generationally unbalanced policy that re-
quires current generations to pay too little
would require future generations to pay
more. If kept in place, each new genera-
tion would pay too little, and the relative
payment burden between current new-
boms and future generations would
worsen over time.
What if the government did nothing about
correcting the generational imbalance im-
plied by current policy — say, for 10 or
20 years? A recomputation of GAs by ex-
tending current policy treatment to gen-
erations projected to be bom between
1990 and 1999 indicates that the growth-
adjusted differential in the GAs of new-
boms in 1999 and 2000 will increase to
35 percent. If generations bom before
2009 are treated as they would be under
current policy, the differential between
the GAs of those born in 2009 and 2010
will rise to 57 percent. A postponement
of policy directed at equalizing burdens
on current and future generations will
gradually exacerbate the generational im-
balance in fiscal policy.
• Correcting the
Generational Imbalance
What can be done to bring the generation-
al accounts of newborns in 1989 and
1990 into balance? Obviously, either
more revenue will have to be extracted
from generations currently living, or
government spending will have to be
reduced. Several avenues are available
for achieving this kind of fiscal balance.
Current generations' net payments can
be raised through higher income, con-
sumption, or payroll taxation or through
a combination of these with reductions
in government spending.
Table 2 shows the effects on the net-
payment burdens of different generations
when various tax rates are increased. In
each case, average tax rates are raised so
that the growth-adjusted GA for future
generations is equalized to that of 1989
newboms. The average income tax rate,
for example, would have to be increased
from 14.5 to 15.3 percent. As a result, the
present value of a 30-year-old "s net pay-
ment would rise by S5.400 for a male
and by S2.50O for a female. However, the
present-value gains to future male and
female generations would be SI3.500
and S6.600. respectively.
Reducing government consumption
alone, on the other hand, would leave the
net-payment burden on current genera-
tions unchanged, but would nevertheless
reduce the amount that future generations
would be required to pay. Calculations in-
dicate that the generational imbalance
would be eliminated if government
spending were permanently reduced by
3.3 percent or by S37 billion annually.
It should be noted that each method of
correcting the generational imbalance
would result in a different profile of an-
nual revenue increases through time.
For example, calculations show that
the 1990 increase in revenue from rais-
ing payroll taxes in order to eliminate
the imbalance would have been S37 bil-
lion, while that from raising capital in-
come taxation would have been S33 bil-
lion. Hence, although all the policies
equalize net-payment burdens on cur-
rent and future newboms. each will
generate a different stream of recorded
deficits through time.• Cnnclniinn
The government's fiscal policies can
have significant long-term effects on the
resources available to members of dif-
ferent generations. Such policies do not
affect all generations equally, and their
implications for cross-generational redis-
tribution are not reflected in the current
deficit numbers. Policy evaluation would
be better served by looking at generation-
al accounts, a system that reveals the dif-
ferential impact of policy changes on the
resources of members of different current
and future generations.
Computations for the United States indi-
cate that current policy (as of 1989) in-
volves a substantial generational im-
balance. If the treatment of all currently
living generations continues unchanged,
future generations will have to bear, on
average, a 20.5 percent larger lifetime net-
payment burden as compared to the bur-
den on current newboms. Undertaking
corrective policy changes soon is impera-
tive if this large generational imbalance is
to be prevented from becoming worse.
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6. This section is a very brief summary of
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Laurence Kotlikoff. "Generational Accounts:
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ing." in David Bradford, ed.. Tax Policy and
the Economy. National Bureau of Economic
Research and MIT Press. No. 5. 1991.
7. In the computations reported below, the
projected future spending and payment
amounts were adjusted for economic growth
at 0.75 percent, and the present-value calcula-
tions were based on a 6 percent interest rate.
8. The absolute magnitudes of the GAs are
sensitive to alternative labeling of govern-
ment receipts and payments. One should
therefore look only at the policy-induced
changes in the GAs for current and future
generations and at the percentage differential
between the GAs for current newborns and
future generations. These are invariant to
changes in the way payments and receipts
are labeled.
9. The ratio between male and female net
payments for future generations is assumed
to be the same as that for current newborns.
Alan Auerhach is a professor of economics at
the University of Pennsylvania and an as-
sociate of the National Bureau of Economic
Research. Jagadeesh Gokhale is an
economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland, and Laurence J. Kottikqffis a
professor of economics at Boston University
and an associate cfthe National Bureau of
Economic Research. The authors wish to
thank William Gavin and Mark Sniderman
for helpful comments. Most of the results
reported here appear in two previous articles
by the authors (see the source lines in table 1
and table 2). Another resource is Kotlikoff.
Generational Accounts: Knowing Who Pays,
and When. For What We Spend. New York:
The Free Press, forthcoming 1992.
The views stated herein are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.Fr-nnnmlr- Cnmrrrrtarv i<: a semimonthb' periodical "'swished by 'he FeHeml Reserve Bank of Cleveland Copies of the titles listed
below are available through the Public Affairs and Bank Relations Department, 1-800-543-3489.
Forecast Accuracy and
Monetary Policy
Michael F. Bryan and William T. Gavin
January 1, 1991
The Sectoral and Regional Effects of
Oil Shocks: Who's over a Barrel?
Paul W. Bauer and Susan M. Byme
January 15,1991




The Effect of War
Expenditures on U.S. Output







Is This Really a "White-Collar
Recession"?
Randall W. Eberts






Public Subsidies for Private Purposes
William P. Osterberg
April 15,1991
Price Stability and Regional Diversity
W. Lee Hoskins
May 1, 1991
The RTC and the Escalating Costs
of the Thrift Insurance Mess
Christopher J. Pike
and James B. Thomson
May 15, 1991
Realignment in the
U.S. Motor Vehicle Industry















John J. Erceg and Lydia K. Leovic
August 1, 1991
Federal Funds Rate Volatility
Diana Dumitru and EJ. Stevens
August 15, 1991
Increasing National Saving:
Are IRAs the Answer?





and Rebecca A. Wetmore
September 15, 1991
Exchange-Market Intervention







Why U.S. Managers Might Be













Please send corrected mailing label to
the above address.
| Material may be reprinted provided that
j the source is credited. Please send copies
j of reprinted materials to the editor.